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CONSTITUTIONAL AND CRIMINAL LAW-EIGHTH AMENDMENT-
Now You CAN'T DO THAT: DISPROPORTIONATE PRISON SENTENCES AS
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENI. Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706
(8th Cir. 2001).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids the
government from imposing "cruel and unusual punishments" on people
convicted of crimes.' What, though, does the prohibition on cruel and un-
usual punishments mean exactly? Is the phrase merely meant to bar such
old-fashioned and outmoded punishments such as thumbscrews, burning at
the stake, or the lopping off of the hands of thieves-in other words, truly
barbaric or torturous physical punishments? Is it limited solely to capital
punishment? Indeed, some would assert that even the State's most benign
and pain-free attempts at capital punishment via lethal injection violate that
constitutional mandate. But can that dictate also apply to a typical prison
sentence? One could argue that anything less than a bizarre and unheard of
punishment would not meet the literal definition of "cruel and unusual." But
the opposite view would have it that even a prison sentence that by its dura-
tion seems way out of proportion to the crime committed falls under the
Eighth Amendment's purview.
This note examines one opinion addressing the Eighth Amendment is-
sue by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Henderson
v. Norris,2 and how the court reasoned that the life sentence of an Arkansas
man for selling less than one-quarter gram of crack cocaine violated the
Eighth Amendment. The note begins by telling the story of Grover Hender-
son's arrest and trial in Lafayette County, and his ill-fated appeal to the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court.3 The note then explores some of the history of the
Eighth Amendment, from its genesis in the seventeenth-century English
Declaration of Rights to its adoption in America and its application by
American courts.4 Next, the note explains the reasoning employed by the
Eighth Circuit in finding Henderson's sentence unconstitutional.5 Finally,
the note addresses the importance of the Eighth Circuit's decision, both in
terms of keeping the Eighth Amendment vibrant in a modem age and within
the overall scheme of America's so-called "war on drugs."6
I. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. 258 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2001).
3. See infra Part II.
4. See inftra Part Il1.
5. See itnra Part IV.
6. See hira Part V.
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II. FACTS
On July 1, 1993, 7 Grover "Knot" Henderson, a forty-six-year-old black
man,8 was arrested in Lafayette County, Arkansas, on suspicion of delivery
of a controlled substance, namely cocaine. 9 Henderson's arrest stemmed
from a drug sale Henderson made to a police informant, instigated by then-
Stamps Police Chief Al Dyar.' ° On April 23, 1993, Chief Dyar gave his
informant, Jerry Revels of Stamps, twenty dollars to make a drug buy and a
microcassette tape recorder to record the transaction." Revels ultimately
met with Henderson, while Chief Dyar positioned himself so that he could
witness the events.' 2 Dyar testified that he saw Henderson retrieve a pill
bottle from his sock, from which he removed a "tin foil" package. 3 Revels
took the package and gave Henderson the twenty dollars.' 4 Revels then went
back to the truck from which Dyar was watching the transaction and gave
Dyar the package and the tape recorder.' 
5
Dyar opened the package and found three rock-like objects. 16 Chemical
analysis at the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory later proved that the rocks
were cocaine base weighing 0.238 grams. 17 Dyar then gave the foil package
and tape to Joe Thomas of the Eighth Judicial District Drug Task Force.' 8
Later that evening, Revels signed a hand-written statement describing how
he had purchased "three rocks" from Henderson. 19 On June 10, 1993, La-
7. Record at 11, Henderson v. State, 322 Ark. 402, 910 S.W.2d 656 (1995) (No. CR
95-326).
8. Id. at 77.
9. Id. at 11.
10. Henderson v. State, 322 Ark. 402, 405, 910 S.W.2d 656, 657 (1995).
11. Id., 910 S.W.2d at 657. Dyar knew Revels was a drug user, and he paid him fifty
dollars per buy to make drug cases against drug sellers. Id., 910 S.W.2d at 657.
12. Id., 910 S.W.2d at 657.
13. Record at 218, 237.
14. Henderson, 322 Ark. at 405, 910 S.W.2d at 657.
15. Id., 910 S.W.2d at 657.
16. Id., 910 S.W.2d at 657.
17. Record at 102, 104-05.
18. Henderson, 322 Ark. at 405, 910 S.W.2d at 657.
19. Id., 910 S.W.2d at 657. On August 22, 1993, however, Revels signed an affidavit
under oath at the request of Henderson's attorney, denying that Henderson had sold him any
cocaine on that night in April. Id. at 405-06, 910 S.W.2d at 657. Revels stated that he merely
talked to Henderson that night about buying crack but that no sale was made. Id. at 406, 910
S.W.2d at 657. Instead, he said that he bought the drugs from someone else coming out of
Henderson's home and that Dyar had threatened him with prosecution on an older burglary
charge unless he implicated Henderson. Id., 910 S.W.2d at 657. Based on those conflicting
statements, Revels was to take a polygraph test, but before its administration Revels again
changed his story. Id., 910 S.W.2d at 657. Revels reaffirmed his initial statement to Chief
Dyar, and he said that he had given the second statement to Henderson's attorney because
Henderson had threatened him. Id., 910 S.W.2d at 657.
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fayette County Circuit Judge Joe E. Griffin signed a warrant for Hender-
son's arrest.
20
Henderson's trial was originally scheduled for December 6, 1993, but
Revels was not present to give his testimony.2' The trial ultimately began on
August 29, 1994.22 Based on the testimony of Revels, Chief Dyar, and La-
fayette County Deputy Sheriff David Briggs,23 a jury convicted Henderson
of delivery of cocaine.24 It was his first drug conviction.25 The jury later
fined Henderson $5000 and sentenced him to life in prison, 26 the most seri-
ous prison term allowed by the statute under which he was convicted.27
20. Record at 11.
21. Henderson, 322 Ark. at 406, 910 S.W.2d at 657. Revels said that Henderson had
heard that Revels had been subpoenaed to testify, but that the subpoena had not yet been
served. Id., 910 S.W.2d at 657. Revels also stated that Henderson drove Revels on the morn-
ing of the trial to a motel in Springhill, Louisiana, paid for the room, and gave Revels money
for food. Id., 910 S.W.2d at 657-58.
22. Id., 910 S.W.2d at 658.
23. Id. at 406-07, 910 S.W.2d at 658.
24. Record at 75. The record reflected that Henderson was not in the courtroom at the
time the guilty verdict was handed down. Id. at 415. Henderson argued on appeal to the
Arkansas Supreme Court that he should have had a mistrial because of a statement made
during the State's closing argument in the penalty phase of the trial, when prosecuting attor-
ney Brent Haltom told the jury:
I want y'all to look around the courtroom, he's not even here to accept the sen-
tence you're going to hand down on him. He's not even here for the guilty ver-
dict. He tried to put this accountability off, he violated the law to do it .... Y'all
do what's right.
Id. at 427. The trial judge cited Henderson for civil contempt of court, fined him $100, and
sentenced him to ten days in the Lafayette County jail, to run consecutively with his criminal
sentence. Id. at 80. Henderson later returned to the courtroom after the jury retired to deliber-
ate his sentence. Id. at 428-32 (offering an explanation for his absence).
25. Henderson, 322 Ark. at 411, 910 S.W.2d at 660. Despite this being Henderson's
first conviction, deputy prosecuting attorney Danny Rodgers argued exclusively for a life
sentence "so that we won't have to worry about 'Knot' Henderson anymore in this county."
Record at 419, 422. Rodgers told the jury that the maximum term of years under the statute
was forty years, which Rodgers said meant that Henderson could be out in ten years. Id. at
422. Rodgers told the jurors that this was "the drug war first hand," and implored them that,
if they wanted to do something in the drug war, they should return with nothing less than a
life sentence. Id.
26. Record at 76.
27. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-401(a)(1) (LEXIS Supp. 2001) (providing that anyone
who manufactures, delivers, or possesses with the intent to manufacture or deliver, a Sched-
ule I or Schedule II controlled substance weighing fewer than twenty-eight grams "shall be
imprisoned for not less than ten (10) years nor more than forty (40) years, or life, and shall be
fined an amount not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000)"). The primary differ-
ence between Schedule I and II drugs is that Schedule I drugs have no accepted medical use
in the United States while Schedule II drugs do have an accepted medical use, under severe
restrictions, but they may lead to severe dependence if abused. See §§ 5-64-203, -205 (Mi-
chie Repl. 1997). Cocaine is a Schedule II controlled substance. See Ark. Dep't of Health,
List of Controlled Substances art. II, 007-07-002 (Weil 2000).
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Henderson appealed both his conviction and his sentence to the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court, raising several points of error, but the court rejected
them all and affirmed the sentence. 28 Henderson's final argument was that
the sentence of life imprisonment for a first offense of selling crack cocaine
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment,
which the court also rejected.29 The court stated that the sentence was within
the limits set by the Arkansas General Assembly and that the court was not
free to reduce a sentence imposed by a trial court within those legislative
limits, even if the court believed the sentence to be too harsh.30 The court
noted three "extremely narrow exceptions" to that general rule: "(1) where
the punishment resulted from passion or prejudice, (2) where it was a clear
abuse of the jury's discretion, or (3) where it was so wholly disproportionate
to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.'1
The Arkansas Supreme Court did not apply those three exceptions
point-by-point to Henderson's case. 32 The court noted, however, with refer-
ence to the third exception, that while this was Henderson's first conviction
for selling crack cocaine, the jury had heard stories of at least one other drug
transaction in which Henderson had been involved.33 The court said the jury
was free to believe that Henderson "was no innocent bystander" when it
came to selling drugs.34 The court ended its analysis of this point by stating
that Henderson was not able to give proof that the sentence shocked the
Prior to arguments in the penalty phase of Henderson's trial, Circuit Judge Jim
Gunter instructed the jury as to the penalty options. Record at 417-18. Gunter also instructed
the jury that it could consider the possibility of Henderson being released on parole if sen-
tenced to a term of years, but not under a life sentence. Id. This ineligibility for parole under
a life sentence would later influence the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals's opinion that the
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. See Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706, 711 (8th
Cir. 2001); infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
28. See Henderson, 322 Ark. at 405, 910 S.W.2d at 657. Henderson first asserted that
there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, challenging the credibility of Chief
Dyar and the sufficiency of the tape-recorded transaction. Id. at 407, 910 S.W.2d at 658.
Henderson next challenged that the State's evidence that Henderson tampered with a witness
was impermissible under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b) as evidence of a separate bad
act. Id. at 408-10, 910 S.W.2d at 658-59. Henderson also asserted that Judge Gunter should
have declared a mistrial based on the statements made during the prosecutor's closing argu-
ment. Id. at 410, 910 S.W.2d at 659-60; see supra note 24.
29. See Henderson, 322 Ark. at 411,910 S.W.2d at 660.
30. Id., 910 S.W.2d at 660.
31. Id. at 411-12, 910 S.W.2d at 660.
32. See id. at412,910S.W.2dat660-61.
33. Id., 910 S.W.2d at 661. The court noted that evidence in the case showed that Hen-
derson had five rocks of crack cocaine with him on that day and gave the five rocks to a girl
to sell, two of which she sold. See id., 910 S.W.2d at 661. The girl, however, had sweated on
the other three rocks, making them soft and less easy to sell. See id., 910 S.W.2d at 661. It




moral sense of the community.35 The court ultimately affirmed Henderson's
life sentence.36
After his loss in the state courts, Henderson petitioned the federal
courts for a writ of habeas corpus" to argue his Eighth Amendment issue.38
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied
the petition but certified it for appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit.39 There, the court would overturn Henderson's sen-




Everyone is familiar with the old yam about letting the punishment fit
the crime. What exactly that means under the constitutional prohibition
against "cruel and unusual punishment" and whether it is a fixed, historical
standard or an evolving one is an idea with which the United States Su-
preme Court has wrestled over the years.4' There have been times when the
Court has ruled that a sentence less than death can still be so excessive as to
be unconstitutional.42
The idea that there should be some proportionality between a person's
crime and his sentence is a concept borne of ancient Hebrew law43 and more
35. See Henderson, 322 Ark. at 412,910 S.W.2d at 661.
36. Id at 405,910 S.W.2d at 657.
37. "Habeas corpus" means in Latin, "that you have the body." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed. 1999). A writ of habeas corpus is used to require a government
official to bring a person before the court, usually a prisoner who is challenging the legal
authority of the government to hold him. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994) (stating
that the United States Supreme Court, an individual justice, a circuit judge, or a district judge
shall consider the case of a person who is in custody following a state court judgment on the
ground that such custody violates the United States Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States).
38. See Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706, 707 (8th Cir. 2001).
39. Id. In a habeas corpus petition under federal law, where the petitioner's detention
arises out of a process in a state court, an appeal of a district court's denial of the writ may
not be taken to the courts of appeal unless a district judge or a circuit judge issues a certifi-
cate of appealability. FED. R. APP. P. 22(b)(1).
40. See Henderson, 258 F.3d at 706.
41. See I WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 2.9(b) (2d ed. 1999).
42. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910); infra notes 84-94, 104-15 and accompanying text.
43. Exodus 21:22-25 (New King James Version).
If men fight, and hurt a woman with child, so that she gives birth prematurely,
yet no lasting harm follows, he shall surely be punished accordingly as the
woman's husband imposes on him; and he shall pay as the judges determine. But
if any lasting harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for
2002]
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recently of the Enlightenment. 44 It is the idea that the state has a duty to
"respect the human dignity of each person."45 The driving spirit behind a
doctrine on proportionality is that the law should not punish someone more
severely than he deserves "for the harm caused and the moral blameworthi-
ness exhibited. ' '46 But the United States's thirty-year "war on drugs" has led
some to believe that any sense of proportion in sentencing, particularly
where drugs are involved, has been scattered to the four winds.47 Some say
the lack of proportionality in any criminal context, not just where drugs are
involved, stems from separation of power concepts-judicial reticence to
second-guess legislative decisions regarding crime and punishment.48 Oth-
ers say that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment is not cognizant of proportionality at all.49 The purpose of this sec-
tion is to provide a brief road map showing a history of proportionality in
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, bum for bum, wound for wound, stripe for
stripe.
Id.; see also Leviticus 19:15 (New King James Version) ("You shall do no injustice in judg-
ment.").
44. Thomas E. Baker & Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Eighth Amendment Challenges to the
Length of a Criminal Sentence: Following the Supreme Court "From Precedent to Prece-
dent", 27 ARIz. L. REv. 25, 27 n.9 (1985). In 1975, student authors suggested the idea that
the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments stems from the Enlightenment. See gener-
ally Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: A Historical Justi-
fication for Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L. REv. 783
(1975). There, the authors asserted that the framers had been influenced by such Enlighten-
ment writers as eighteenth century philosopher Cesare Beccaria. Id. at 806-30; see also
Charles Walter Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling
Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 378, 381 (1980); see also Stephen
T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality: A New Perspective on the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause, 68 TENN. L. REv. 41, 62-63 (2000) (setting out a general discussion of Beccaria
and the utilitarian theory of punishment).
45. Baker & Baldwin, supra note 44, at 27.
46. Id. at 26; see also Francis A. Allen, A Matter of Proportion, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 343
(2001).
47. See generally Debate, Mandatory Minimums in Drug Sentencing: A Valuable
Weapon in the War on Drugs or a Handcuff on Judicial Discretion?, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
1279 (1999) (publishing a debate between federal Judge Stanley Sporkin and then-United
States Representative Asa Hutchinson, a former United States Attorney and currently the
director of the federal Drug Enforcement Administration). In the debate, Judge Sporkin
criticized the effect that federal mandatory-minimum laws and the lack of proportionality
between drug convictions and the subsequent sentences has had on "these little people, who
have no voting constituency," presaging an assertion by Congressman Hutchinson that if
people do not approve of the harshness of mandatory minimums then they can take it up with
their congressmen. Id. at 1294-95.
48. See Robert L. Misner, A Strategy for Mercy, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1303, 1358
(2000).
49. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (plurality opinion). Only Justice
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed on that point. Id. at 961, 965.
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American law and how the courts, primarily the United States Supreme
Court, have dealt with the issue.
A. The Eighth Amendment and a Stroll Toward Proportionality
The framers of the Constitution did not leave us with a "definitions"
section to let future generations know exactly what was meant in the words
they chose. This has left the courts to grope, or sometimes flail, in search of
more precise meanings to some terms that could be open to debate. For
many years, the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the Eighth
Amendment was not one of those.50 California attorney Anthony Granucci,
in a 1969 article, posits that for many years judges and scholars both had
accepted the conclusion that the Eighth Amendment simply prohibited tor-
ture and barbaric punishments and did not address penalties excessive to the
crimes committed.5'
1. A Brief History of the Eighth Amendment
The text of the Eighth Amendment is almost a verbatim recitation of a
similar provision of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which was itself an
exact copy of a provision of the English Bill of Rights of 1689.52 The Eng-
lish Parliament enacted a Bill of Rights after William of Orange took over
the English throne in 1688.53 There is a conflict, however, between tradi-
tional history and more modem scholarship as to the events that served as
the launching point of the English prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ments. 
54
Traditional history has it that the prohibition on cruel and unusual pun-
ishments was the result of the "Bloody Assizes."55 The Bloody Assizes re-
fers to a special commission established by King James II, and led by
King's Bench Chief Justice George Jeffreys,5 6 to try captured rebels follow-
ing the ill-fated revolt against the king by James's nephew, the Duke of
50. See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: " The
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839 (1969).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 840. The only significant difference between the provision in the Eighth
Amendment and the English Bill of Rights is the substitution of the word "shall" in the
American version for the word "ought" in the English version. See id. at 853.
53. See Parr, supra note 44, at 43 (stating that the purpose of the bill was to remedy the
abuses committed during James II's reign).
54. See, e.g., Granucci, supra note 50, at 853; Parr, supra note 44, at 46; Schwartz,
supra note 44, at 378.
55. See Schwartz, supra note 44, at 378.
56. See Granucci, supra note 50, at 853.
2002]
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Monmouth. 7 During the trials, Sir Henry Pollfexen, the chief prosecutor for
the special commission, let it be known that anyone accused of treason who
pleaded guilty would not be put to death.58 While the'plea offer was honored
for a time, the government later executed almost 200 prisoners who had
accepted the plea bargain.5 9 Puritan propaganda against Jeffreys-and by
extension James II, who had appointed Jeffreys Lord Chancellor-and his
"insane lust for cruelty" spread, leading traditional history to mark the
Bloody Assizes as the spur for an English declaration against cruel and un-
usual punishments upon the abdication of James 11.60
A modem view insists that the prohibition stemmed from the "Titus
Oates Affair.",61 Titus Oates was one of the Puritan pamphleteers. 62 In Sep-
tember 1678, Oates told about a "Popish Plot" to assassinate the Protestant
King Charles 11.63 Oates, however, had made up the story as a way of solidi-
fying the opposition against a Catholic retaking the throne.64 With political
backing, Oates swore to his story, and as a result, a number of Catholics
were executed.65 Ultimately, Oates came before Chief Justice Jeffreys on a
perjury charge.6 6 The court convicted Oates and sentenced him to a high
fine and life imprisonment.67 The sentence also required Oates to be
whipped, pilloried four times a year, and be stripped of his clerical posi-
tion.68 After James II was dethroned, the House of Commons, disagreeing
with the House of Lords, denounced Oates's punishment as being cruel and
57. Id.
58. Id. at 854. Execution for treason in England at that time consisted of hanging a
person by the neck, cutting him down while still alive, disemboweling him and having his
entrails burnt before him, and then beheading and quartering him. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 854-55 (quoting 2 G.M. TREVELYAN, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 467 (illus. ed.
1956)). Granucci disputes the traditional notion that the methods of execution following the
Bloody Assizes was the impetus behind the cruel and unusual language in the English Bill of
Rights, noting that similar methods of execution continued after the enactment of the bill. See
id. at 855-56. Granucci also notes that a member of the committee drafting the bill was
Henry Pollfexen, and he says that it would be unlikely that Pollfexen would have helped
draft a bill that rebuked his own past actions. Id. at 856.
61. Id. at 856-58.
62. See Granucci, supra note 50, at 854. Oates was also a Church of England clergyman
and, as Granucci put it, "an inveterate perjurer." Id. at 857.




67. Id. at 858.
68. Granucci, supra note 50, at 858. Pilloring was the act of placing an offender's head
and hands in a wooden framework. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1168 (7th ed. 1999). It is
similar to the stocks, except that the offender had to stand instead of sit as in stocks. Id.
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unusual.69 Granucci states that this was the only recorded contemporary use
of the term "cruel and unusual. 70
Blackstone's Commentaries was virtually the only legal treatise the
Americans had at their disposal during the colonial period that discussed
criminal punishments, and it directly referenced the English Bill of Rights.7 '
By the time of the drafting of the American Bill of Rights, several colonies
already had laws that prohibited cruel and unusual punishments.7 z By the
time of the drafting of the Constitution, such founders as Patrick Henry and
George Mason, whose provision against cruel and unusual punishments had
been included in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, spoke of the necessity
of barring the government from using torture as a means of punishment.
73
The records of the debates on the adoption of the Eighth Amendment led
some scholars to believe that what the Amendment was designed to prohibit
was not excessive punishment but only torture and other cruel methods of
punishment.
74
2. Leading Up to Weems v. United States: The Court Begins to Look
at the Cruel and Unusual Clause
It was almost eighty years after the adoption of the Eighth Amendment
of the Constitution in 1791 that the Supreme Court first heard a proportion-
ality-of-sentence challenge in the case of Pervear v. Massachusetts.75 In that
case, a man was convicted of operating a tenement for the sale of liquor
without a license and was sentenced to pay a fifty-dollar fine and serve three
months in jail. 76 The Court rejected the defendant's proportionality argu-
ment, holding that the Eighth Amendment applied to only federal legislation
69. Granucci, supra note 50, at 858-59.
70. Id. at 859.
71. See Parr, supra note 44, at 45-46. It has been argued that the American founders had
mistaken Blackstone's account in his Commentaries regarding the Titus Oates affair and the
disproportionate punishment he received for his perjury with that of the "Bloody Assizes"
and the torturous executions meted out in those cases. See Granucci, supra note 50, at 865.
Author's note: It is interesting to note that Chief Justice Jeffreys was a key figure in both the
"Bloody Assizes" and the Titus Oates affair, which could have led to the framers' confusion.
72. See Granucci, supra note 50, at 860 (stating how the Massachusetts Code of 1648,
which was written forty years before the English Bill of Rights, contained provisions prohib-
iting torture and like punishments, and how other colonies were influenced by the code in
drafting their own laws).
73. Schwartz, supra note 44, at 382.
74. See Granucci, supra note 50, at 865; see also Schwartz, supra note 44, at 382.
75. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1866); see also Schwartz, supra note 44, at 382.
76. Pervear, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 480.
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and not to the states. 77 In any event, the Court said, in dicta, that it did not
think the punishment was cruel, unusual, or excessive.78
The next discussion of the Eighth Amendment's bar on cruel and un-
usual punishment was eleven years after Pervear in Wilkerson v. Utah.7 9
Wilkerson was convicted of murder in the Territory of Utah and was con-
demned to die by firing squad.80 The Supreme Court rebuffed his ultimate
appeal, saying that shooting or hanging as methods of capital punishment
were not inconsistent with the Constitution. 8' A few more cases made their
way to the Supreme Court, challenging punishments as cruel and unusual,
and all were turned away.82 That was until a civil servant in the Philippines
took issue with his sentence for falsifying a public record.83
In Weems v. United States,84 an officer for the Bureau of Coast Guard
and Transportation for the United States Government in the Philippine Is-
lands was convicted of falsifying a public record8 5 and sentenced to fifteen
years of cadena temporal.86 Justice McKenna, writing for the Court, said
that the judiciary had not exactly determined what constituted cruel and
unusual punishment,8 7 the Court's writings in In re Kemmler88 notwith-
standing.89 McKenna did say, however, that punishments like the cadena
77. See id. at 479-80.
78. Id. at 480.
79. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
80. Id. at 130-31.
81. See id. at 134-35.
82. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892) (dismissing appeal of a man who
was convicted for numerous bootlegging violations, assessed a $9500 fine and costs, and
sentenced to one month at hard labor, plus an additional fifty-four years if he did not pay the
fines within that month). The Court's decision was based on its holding that there was no
federal question at hand. Id. at 334-35. In dissent, Justice Harlan argued that there was a
federal question involved, that the sentence was excessive and that the Eighth Amendment
was binding on the states by the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 370-71
(Harlan, J., dissenting); see also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890) (holding that
electrocution was not cruel and unusual and that the Eighth Amendment was designed to
prohibit punishments such as "burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the
like").
83. See infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
84. 217U.S.349(1910).
85. The document was a "cash book of the captain," which Weems kept in his job as the
bureau's disbursing officer. Id. at 357.
86. See Baker & Baldwin, supra note 44, at 29. "Cadena temporal" means "temporary
chain." Id. It was a holdover punishment from the Spanish colonists and consisted of impris-
onment and hard labor while being shackled about the wrist and ankle. Id. A permanent loss
of civil liberties was also a part of the punishment. Id.
87. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 368 (citing McDonald v. Massachusetts, 53 N.E. 874 (Mass.
1899)).
88. 136 U.S. 436 (1890); see also supra note 82.
89. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 370. Justice McKenna noted that the Court's ruling in In re
Kemmler was not on the cruel and usual punishment aspect, adding that what the Court did
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"amaze those who have formed their conception of the relation of a state to
even its offending citizens from the practice of the American common-
wealths, and believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense." 90 Stating a principle
that still is debated to the present day, Justice McKenna asserted that the
Constitution must be a living document subject to differing interpretations
upon the passage of time.9' Ultimately, the Court held that the punishment
of cadena temporal for falsifying a public record was prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment, and it ordered the case against Weems dismissed.
92
Despite the significance of Weems, 93 the holding was fact-specific, and as
such, it did not serve as the key to opening a floodgate of sentence ap-
peals.94 In 1958, forty-eight years after Weems, a plurality of the Court held
that the revocation of citizenship of a soldier who had deserted violated the
Eighth Amendment. 95
The next step in what Professor Grossman called the Court's "tortured
approach,96 to the Eighth Amendment's meaning is the 1980 case of Rum-
mel v. Estelle.97 Rummel, convicted in 1973 of obtaining $120.75 by false
pretenses--a felony--was sentenced under Texas's recidivist statute to life
imprisonment. 98 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, initially noted the
say about it was not meant to be a comprehensive definition of the phrase. Id.
90. Id. at 366-67.
91. See id. at 373. Justice McKenna said, "Time works changes .... Therefore, a prin-
ciple to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth."
Id.
92. See id. at 382. In dissent, Justice White criticized the Court's new doctrine. See id.
at 409 (White, J. dissenting). He relied upon the traditional reading of the cruel and unusual
clause as meaning a prohibition on torture and barbarous punishments or a bar on judges
sentencing outside statutory limits. See Parr, supra note 44, at 51-52.
93. Professors Baker and Baldwin state how surprised and shocked some legal commen-
tators were over the Weems decision when it came down. See Baker & Baldwin, supra note
44, at 30 n.32 (quoting L. BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 67
(1975)).
94. See Parr, supra note 44, at 52. In addition, Schwartz asserts that it was the very
nature of cadena temporal, plus the post-prison accessory punishments, that added up, in the
Court's mind, to a cruel and unusual punishment. Schwartz, supra note 44, at 385.
95. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 87, 103 (1958). In the plurality opinion, Chief
Justice Warren harkened back to Justice McKenna's opinion in Weems, stating that the
Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 101.
96. Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court's
Tortured Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107 (1995).
97. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
98. Id. at 266. Rummel's prior two felonies were fraudulent use of a credit card to ob-
tain $80 worth of goods or services and passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Id.
at 265. Professor Joshua Dressier sarcastically noted in his article on the case that Rummel's
total take in his "crime spree" was $229.11. See Joshua Dressier, Substantive Criminal Law
Through the Looking Glass of Rummel v. Estelle: Proportionality and Justice as Endan-
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Court's past pronouncements regarding sentences deemed grossly dispro-
portionate to the crime, most recently those having to do with capital pun-
ishment.99 Justice Rehnquist, however, drew a line, although a not very
bright one, °° between death penalty cases and non-capital cases, saying that
one could argue that a term of years in prison as punishment is within the
legislative prerogative.'0 ' The Court's reason for affirming Rummel's sen-
tence was fourfold: (1) the Court hesitates to review prison sentences set by
a state legislature; (2) it will not conduct such reviews absent some objec-
tive factors to guide it in determining what is grossly disproportionate; (3)
Rummel's case lacked a bright-line objectivity; and (4) Texas's recidivist
statute was constitutional.' 0 2 In dissent, Justice Powell relied on Weems,
Trop, and other cases, arguing that proportionality in sentencing is part-and-
parcel of the Eighth Amendment.10 3 It was a clarion call that would be heard
three years later in Solem v. Helm.
10 4
B. The Court Continues to Draw Lines in the Sand on Proportionality,
Then Erases Them
While the holdings in Weems and Trop seemed to move the Court in
the direction of finding the idea of proportionality within the Eighth
Amendment, the ruling in Rummel seemed to reverse the Court's course.
From that case, it appeared that no lengthy prison sentence might be held to
violate the Constitution. Then, in 1983, came Solem v. Helm.1
0 5
1. Solem v. Helm and a Test for Proportionality
A bright-line test for proportionality, which Justice Rehnquist said
was necessary in Rummel, began to shine with the Court's ruling in Solem v.
Helm. 10 6 Jerry Helm was a six-time non-violent felon when he received a
sentence of life imprisonment in South Dakota in 1979, under that state's
recidivist statute for passing a "no-account" check for one hundred dol-
gered Doctrines, 34 Sw. L.J. 1063, 1064 (1981).
99. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 271-72 (citing Weems and Trop, as well as some death penalty
cases that had touched upon the proportionality question).
100. See Dressier, supra note 98, at 1067; see also Baker & Baldwin, supra note 44, at
36.
101. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274.
102. Dressier, supra note 98, at 1067-68.
103. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 288-95 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Baker & Baldwin,
supra note 44, at 34-35.





lars. 0 7 Helm appealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court, arguing that the
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, but the court affirmed the sen-
tence. 0 8 Helm filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court, which the
lower court denied. 109 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
granted the writ, distinguishing between Helm's case and Rummel."o To the
Eighth Circuit, Rummel's case was different because he would have had a
chance at parole, whereas Helm would not have; thus, Helm's sentence was
grossly disproportionate to his crime."'
The State appealed, and the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Eighth Circuit's ruling.1 2 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, cited Weems
and concluded that there was no hedging in that decision regarding the con-
stitutional necessity for proportionality in sentencing.' 3 Justice Powell then
outlined the following three-point test that might give courts some objective
bright line to determine if sentences were disproportional: (1) the serious-
ness of the offense and the severity of the punishment; (2) the sentences
imposed on other criminals for other offenses within the same jurisdiction;
and (3) the sentences imposed for the same offense elsewhere. 14 For the
next eight years, Solem would become the closest thing to a guiding princi-
ple the courts had in determining whether a sentence was disproportion-
ate. 115
107. Id. at 279, 281.
108. Id. at 283. Following the state supreme court's ruling, Helm asked the governor to
commute his sentence to a term of years that would make him eligible for parole, but the
governor declined to do so. Id.
109. Id. The district court acknowledged that the punishment was harsh, but it decided
that Rummel was binding and thus denied the writ. Id.
110. Solem, 463 U.S. at 283.
111. Id. at 283-84.
112. Id. at 284.
113. See id. at 286-87. The State argued that there is no basis for proportionality when it
comes to prison sentences because of Rummel and the language Justice Rehnquist used in
that case that "one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court
that for crimes ... classified ... as felonies, . . . the length of sentence actually imposed is
purely a matter of legislative prerogative." Id. at 288 n.14 (emphasis in original). Justice
Powell dismissed that language as merely stating that one could make such an argument, a
line of reasoning that Professor Grossman called "at best unpersuasive and perhaps some-
what disingenuous." Grossman, supra note 96, at 129-30.
114. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. In dissent, Chief Justice Burger criticized the majority for
breaking with Rummel, yet without expressly overturning it, and for trampling over the rights
of the states. Id. at 304 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
115. Professor Grossman characterized the Court's result in Solem as "an unsatisfying
mixture of confusion and division." Grossman, supra note 96, at 142. That academic slight
notwithstanding, Solem's influence has extended beyond the criminal courts into civil cases.
See. e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432-35 (2001)
(citing Solem in the overall context of a challenge to a punitive damages award complained
of as unconstitutionally excessive).
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2. Harmelin v. Michigan: The Court Smudges Powell's Bright Line
In 1990 the Supreme Court again heard an Eighth Amendment chal-
lenge to a prison sentence, but this time the result was very different." 6 A
Michigan court convicted Ronald Harmelin of possessing 672 grams of
cocaine and sentenced him to a mandatory life sentence without the possi-
bility of parole. 17 In a fractured plurality opinion, the Court affirmed the
sentence.118 In its holding, the Court rebuffed Harmelin's assertion that a
mandatory life sentence without any consideration of mitigating factors was
cruel and unusual." 9 The Court said that while severe, mandatory penalties
may well be cruel, they are not unusual in the constitutional sense when one
looks at the country's history of sentencing. 20 The Court refused to require
a mitigation hearing-which is required in death penalty cases-for cases
involving only a prison term, even if the term is life without the possibility
of parole.' 2' Rather, the Court focused on the irrevocability of death with
the possibility, however slight, of a future reduction in a prison sentence as
justifying different treatment.
1 22
Writing only for himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia
took an even harder line. 23 In Part I-A of his opinion, Scalia examined the
previous proportionality cases to come before the Court, but saved his harsh
words for the Court's decision in Solem v. Helm. 24 Scalia wrote that the 5-4
decision in Solem was hardly a clear expression of constitutional doctrine.
25
After Scalia discussed the cases that had gone before, he bluntly said that
the ruling in Solem was "simply wrong" and that "the Eighth Amendment
contains no proportionality guarantee.' 26
In a separate opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor
and Souter, said he agreed with the judgment but was not willing to go as
116. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion).
117. Id. at961.
118. See id. at 961, 996. Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, as to the judgment and
as to Part IV. Id. at 960. Only Rehnquist joined Scalia in Parts I, II, and III. Id. at 961.
119. See id. at 994-95. Harmelin said that the fact that this was his first felony conviction
should have been taken into account at sentencing. See id. at 994.
120. Id. at 994-95.
121. Id. at 995-96.
122. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995-96.
123. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
124. See Harmelin, 50 U.S. at 965.
125. Id.
126. Id. Scalia then went on to discuss the history of the cruel and unusual punishment
concept and concluded that the similar prohibition in the English Bill of Rights was not at all
addressing disproportionate sentences. He stated that the framers understood proportionality
and excessiveness and if that is what they meant, they would have said so. See id. at 967-85;
see also Grossman, supra note 96, at 143.
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far one way or the other with Justice Scalia on one end or Justice White on
the other. 127 Kennedy said that the Court's past decisions recognized the
concept of proportionality within the Eighth Amendment, even in noncapi-
tal cases.' 28 Kennedy looked to Weems, Rummel, and Solem, as affirming
the existence of the proportionality principle. 129 Kennedy cited four guiding
principles-"the primacy of the legislature" and judicial deference, the
various legitimate punishment systems, federalism, and the need for objec-
tive factors to guide courts in proportionality reviews-and concluded that
"[t]he Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between
crime and sentence," but it does prohibit extreme sentences that are "grossly
disproportionate."1
30
Justice Kennedy began by comparing Harmelin's crime and punish-
ment with that of Jerry Helm' and concluded that Harmelin's crime was
more serious than Helm's.' 32 Thus, Kennedy concluded, Helm's sentence
was within constitutional limits.' 33 Kennedy did not compare Harmelin's
sentence with that which he might have received in other states, because
Kennedy did not believe that the holding in Solem was a "rigid three-point"
test."'134 Because Kennedy concluded that the first part of the Solem analysis
showed that the sentence Ilarmelin received was not grossly disproportion-
ate, there was no need to address the other two parts of the test.
135
Following the Harmelin decision, a number of courts began to look to
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion acknowledging the existence of pro-
portionality when considering proportionality cases. 136 The narrowness of
Kennedy's concurrence, however, has made successful challenges to prison
127. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice White, in a dis-
senting opinion, argued that while drug crimes are serious, Harmelin had only been con-
victed of possession, not the more serious crime of possession with intent to distribute. Id. at
1025 (White, J., dissenting). As such, his punishment for the lesser crime should not have
been the same as for the greater one. Id. at 1024 (White, J., dissenting). White also applied
the three-pronged Solem test and found Harmelin's sentence constitutionally excessive. Id. at
1027 (White, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
129. See id. at 997-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 288, 303).
130. Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 1002 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 1004-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Professor Grossman summarized Justice
Kennedy's point here as Kennedy's not reading Solem "as requiring use of the comparative
factors in every challenge to a sentence based on disproportionality." Grossman, supra note
96, at 153 (emphasis added).
136. See Grossman, supra note 96, at 156 n.325 (citations omitted).
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terms in noncapital cases still hard to come by, 137 particularly in drug
cases.
1 38
C. Proportionality in Arkansas
The idea of proportionality in sentencing was not new to the Arkansas
Supreme Court when it reviewed Grover Henderson's case. 139 Indeed, as
Justice Brown noted in his dissent in Henderson, the court had "contem-
plated" the concept of proportionality at least as far back as 1941.140 In fact,
the Arkansas Supreme Court has overturned and reduced a sentence as be-
ing too harsh, although not specifically under the rubric of the Eighth
Amendment. 141 In Carle v. Burnett,142 the Arkansas Supreme Court over-
turned the ninety-day jail sentence of a lawyer found in contempt of court
for failing to proceed in a case. 143 Without addressing the cruel and unusual
clause or any of the leading United States Supreme Court cases on the sub-
137. See Parr, supra note 44, at 58.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 30 F.3d 48 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that mandatory
life imprisonment for third felony drug conviction did not violate the Eighth Amendment);
United States v. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d 604 (4th Cir. 1994) (affirming a life sentence for distribut-
ing more than fifty grams of cocaine base); United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 1549 (10th Cir.
1992) (holding that a nineteen-year prison sentence for distributing cocaine base did not
violate the Eighth Amendment); United States v. Lowden, 955 F.2d 128 (1st Cir. 1992)
(holding that a seven-year prison sentence for distributing 7.7 grams of LSD did not violate
the Eighth Amendment); United States v. Gordon, 953 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding
that a twenty-one-year prison sentence for aiding and abetting the manufacture of drugs was
not disproportionate); United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1991) (rejecting a
disproportionality challenge to a seventeen-year sentence for possession with intent to dis-
tribute less than 500 grams of cocaine); United States ex rel. Foules v. Roth, 2001 WL
1134853 (N.D. I1l. Sept. 25, 2001) (holding that a fifteen-year sentence for possession of
cocaine with intent to deliver was not disproportionate and noting that it was below the
maximum allowed by state law); State v. Smith, 48 S.W.3d 159 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000)
(holding that a sixty-year prison sentence for possession with intent to deliver 0.5 grams of
cocaine within drug-free school zone was not grossly disproportionate).
139. See Henderson v. State, 322 Ark. 402, 415-16, 910 S.W.2d 656, 662-63 (1995)
(Brown, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 415-16, 910 S.W.2d at 662-63 (Brown, J., dissenting) (citing Williams v.
State, 320 Ark. 498, 898 S.W.2d 38 (1995); Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7
(1993); Dunlap v. State, 303 Ark. 222, 795 S.W.2d 920 (1990); Parker v. State, 302 Ark.
509, 790 S.W.2d 894 (1990); Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 265, 658 S.W.2d 350 (1983);
Chaviers v. State, 267 Ark. 6, 588 S.W.2d 434 (1979); Pridgeon v. State, 266 Ark. 651, 587
S.W.2d 225 (1979); Stout v. State, 263 Ark. 355, 565 S.W.2d 23 (1978); Collins v. State, 261
Ark. 195, 548 S.W.2d 106 (1977); Hinton v. State, 260 Ark. 42, 537 S.W.2d 800 (1976);
Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973); Davis v. State, 246 Ark. 838, 440
S.W.2d 244 (1969); Geurin v. City of Little Rock, 203 Ark. 103, 155 S.W.2d 719 (1941);
Scott v. State, 27 Ark. App. 1, 764 S.W.2d 625 (1989)).
141. See generally Carle, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7.
142. 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).
143. Id. at 478, 484, 845 S.W.2d at 8, 11.
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ject, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that Carle's punishment, in light of
the "facts and circumstances" surrounding his case, was "unduly harsh."'
144
In cases involving drugs, however, defendants have not been so fortu-
nate. 141 In Pridgeon v. State,146 the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected a cruel
and unusual punishment argument against the doubling of a prison sentence
for a defendant twice convicted of drug-related offenses. 147 Other Eighth
Amendment challenges in drug cases received the same chilly reception.
148
Grover Henderson looked as if he were going to be just another Arkansas
defendant whose drug conviction sentence would withstand an Eighth
Amendment challenge-that is, until the Eighth Circuit took a look.
IV. REASONING
Before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals could discuss the merits of
Henderson's constitutional claim, it had to address the standard of review
under which it would hear Henderson's appeal. 149 The court addressed the
standard because, between Henderson's 1995 loss in the Arkansas Supreme
Court and the time the Eighth Circuit heard his appeal,150 Congress had
passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA),' 5 ' which placed stricter limitations on state prisoners' appeals to
the federal courts for relief of state court judgments. 5 2 The court explained
144. Id. at 483-84, 845 S.W.2d at 11. The court ultimately reduced Carle's punishment to
five days in jail and a $500 fine. Id. at 484, 845 S.W.2d at 11.
145. See Henderson, 322 Ark. at 414-15, 910 S.W.2d at 662 (Brown, J., dissenting)
(citing a list of drug case sentences the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed).
146. 266 Ark. 651,587 S.W.2d 225 (1979).
147. Id. at 653, 587 S.W.2d at 227. Pridgeon received a forty-five-year sentence under a
statute that allowed for the doubling of the "normal penalty" for a drug offense for twice-
convicted offenders. Id. at 652, 587 S.W.2d at 226.
148. See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 327 Ark. 652, 941 S.W.2d 387 (1997) (rejecting an appeal
based on the proportionality of a ninety-five-year prison sentence for multiple drug offenses);
Teas v. State, 266 Ark. 572, 587 S.W.2d 28 (1979) (stating that the imposition of a statutory
maximum prison term and fine for sale of morphine and marijuana was not cruel and unusual
punishment); Cardwell v. State, 264 Ark. 862, 575 S.W.2d 682 (1979) (holding that an eight-
een-year prison sentence for the sale of $180 worth of cocaine was not cruel and unusual
punishment); Ryan v. State, 260 Ark. 270, 538 S.W.2d 702 (1976) (rejecting a cruel and
unusual punishment challenge to a four-year prison term and a $7500 fine for possession of
marijuana with the intent to deliver).
149. See Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706, 707-08 (8th Cir. 2001). A panel of the court
of appeals decided the case 3-0, with the opinion written by Circuit Judge Morris Sheppard
Arnold. Id. at 707.
150. Id.
151. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of the United States Code and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure).
152. See id. at 1217-21. The AEDPA imposed strict limitations on writs of habeas corpus
by creating a one-year statute of limitations for petitions, requiring that state prisoners ex-
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that Henderson filed his petition to the federal courts before the effective
date of the AEDPA, 153 and as such, it would review the case under pre-
AEDPA law. 1
54
The court next turned to Henderson's point of appeal, his Eighth
Amendment argument. 55 After reciting the language of the Eighth Amend-
ment, the court immediately turned its attention to Solem v. Helm5 6 and
Harmelin v. Michigan'57 -the two significant recent cases in the area of
disproportionality of sentences. 58 The court noted how the Supreme Court
declared in Solem that a "punishment is cruel and unusual if it is 'grossly
disproportionate' to the crime."' 59 In a brief review of the facts and holding
in Harmelin, the Eighth Circuit pointed to the sharp division among the
Justices.16 Although five Justices affirmed Harmelin's life sentence without
parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine, the Eighth Circuit looked to
the fact that three affirming Justices refused to join the other two, Justice
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, 16 who would have overruled Solem ant'
stated that the Eighth Amendment does not countenance proportionality.
62
Rather, the Eighth Circuit made a point of noting that those three affirming
Justices in Harmelin believed that the Eighth Amendment does allow for the
concept of proportionality, despite the sentence in Harmelin not rising to
that "grossly disproportionate" level. 1
63
The Eighth Circuit used Justice Kennedy's view of the majority opin-
ion in Solem164 and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Harmelin as
the basis for its analysis of Henderson's case.' 65 In announcing how it
would conduct its analysis, the court of appeals stated that first it would
haust all state remedies before applying for federal habeas corpus relief, and establishing a
"gatekeeping" system for second or successive habeas petitions. See id.
153. See Henderson, 258 F.3d at 707.
154. Id. at 707-08 (discussing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)). In addition to
arguing that the federal court must give deference to the state court's findings of fact, with
which the court of appeals agreed, the State also argued that the federal court must give
deference to the state court's resolution of federal law, which the court declined to do. Id. at
707.
155. Id. at 708.
156. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
157. 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion).
158. Henderson, 258 F.3d at 708; see also supra notes 106-35 and accompanying text.
159. Henderson, 258 F.3d at 708.
160. Id.
161. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
162. Henderson, 258 F.3d at 708.
163. Id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring)).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 130-33.
165. Henderson, 258 F.3d at 709; see also supra note 114 and accompanying text (outlin-
ing Justice Powell's three-point test laid out in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)).
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compare the seriousness of the crime with the severity of punishment meted
out,166 the "grossly disproportionate" review Justice Kennedy conducted in
Harmelin. Within that comparison, the court would assess the seriousness of
the crime by measuring the harm caused to a particular victim or to society
against the defendant's blameworthiness and the level of his involvement.
67
Then the court would evaluate a defendant's culpability by looking at his
motive and intent.
68
In applying that part of the analysis to Henderson's case, the court ac-
knowledged that drug crimes usually can be considered serious.169 The court
explained, however, that "it denies reality and contradicts precedent to say
that all drug crimes are of equal seriousness and pose the same threat to
society."' 170 The court looked to Solem and how the Supreme Court had
placed importance on how the "absolute magnitude" of the offense may be
instructive in evaluating the harm or threat posed to society.' 7' The Eighth
Circuit pointed out that Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Harmelin
stressed that the amount of cocaine involved in that case influenced the con-
curring Justices to uphold the life without parole sentence, determining that
such a large amount posed a threat to society significant enough to warrant
the sentence.
t 72
By contrast, the court held that the amount of drugs involved in Hen-
derson's case was "extraordinarily small," less than one-quarter of a gram,
compared to the 672 grams in Harmelin.173 The absolute magnitude of the
drugs in Harmelin was nearly 2825 times the weight of that for which Hen-
derson was convicted.174 Even taking into account two other rocks a girl had
sold for Henderson, which the jury was not told it could take into account at
sentencing, that only amounted to five rocks for a total value of $33.33.175
As to Henderson's culpability, the court viewed the circumstances in-
volving his ultimate arrest as illuminating. 76 The court noted that Hender-
son had not initiated the contact between himself and Revels, had not tried
166. Henderson, 258 F.3d at 709.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring)).
170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 293 (1983)).
172. Henderson, 258 F.3d at 709.
173. Id. at 710.
174. Id. (noting that the price of the drugs for which Henderson was convicted was only
twenty dollars).
175. Id. The State had argued that the amount of drugs was irrelevant, but the court re-





to force or coerce Revels into making the buy, nor had he attempted to sell
Revels any more than the three rocks for which he was convicted. 77 The
court further stated that there was no evidence that Henderson had engaged
in violence during the transaction, had any weapons, or as the defendant in
Harmelin, possessed any "'trappings' of the drug trade.' 78 Additionally, the
fact that Henderson had no prior convictions was significant for the Eighth
Circuit. 79 In brushing back the State's argument that it was free to impose a
mandatory sentence despite no prior convictions, the court pointed to the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Rummel that recidivism is a factor to take
into account when fixing a severe sentence. 80 Thus, the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded, the facts sifted through this part of the analysis did not support Hen-
derson's strict sentence. 181
The court next looked at the severity of Henderson's sentence.18 2 The
court pointed out that the life sentence Henderson received is surpassed in
severity by only two other penalties: a sentence of death, reserved for only
capital murder or treason, and a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole. 83 The distinction between a life sentence and a sentence of life in
prison without the possibility of parole is one without much difference in
practice, the court reasoned. 84 The court pointed out that under a life sen-
tence without the possibility of parole, a prisoner is precluded from ever
being eligible for parole, even if the governor commutes the life sentence to
a fixed term of years.' 85 A sentence of life, on the other hand, precludes the
possibility of parole unless the governor grants clemency and commutes the
sentence to a term of years, at which point the prisoner becomes eligible for
parole in the same way as all other prisoners. 1
86
177. Id.
178. Henderson, 258 F.3d at 710.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980)); see supra notes 97-103
and accompanying text.
181. Henderson, 258 F.3d at 710. The court added, in considering Henderson's culpabil-
ity, that the Arkansas Supreme Court, in rejecting Henderson's Eighth Amendment argu-
ment, had not considered the evidence that Henderson had tried to prevent Revels from testi-
fying at trial, and that the jury had not been instructed that it could consider that evidence
when imposing sentence. Id. This seemed to be important to the Eighth Circuit in that it
focused the sentence and, thus, the Eighth Amendment argument, solely on the drugs sold as
the principal felony and not on the attendant circumstances. Id. at 710-1 1.
182. Id. at 711.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-104(b), -606, -607(b)-(c)).
186. Id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-607(c)(1)). The court also noted that the jury at
Henderson's trial was specifically instructed that a person sentenced to life imprisonment is
not eligible for parole. Id.
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Bearing that distinction in mind, the court turned aside the State's con-
tention that a life sentence is not as severe as life without the possibility of
parole because some prisoners under a simple life sentence have received
commutations from the governor. 87 The court said it could find nothing in
the record before it that would show the number of prisoners who have
asked for a commutation or the amount of time such prisoners under a life
sentence have served before being granted a commutation. 88 In any event,
the court said, past performance is not indicative of future results, particu-
larly when the power to grant a commutation rests with the governor, who
can change in person and temperament with each election, and who can
wield that power with arbitrary sway. 89 The court quoted the Supreme
Court in Solem regarding the difference between parole and commutation:
"Parole is ... part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behavior, it
is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases ... [while] the possi-
bility of commutation ... is little different from the possibility of executive
clemency .. . ."'90 It is from that analysis of the severity of the crime and
the harshness of punishment that the court concluded that Henderson's sen-
tence was grossly disproportionate to his crime. '91
That, however, was not the end of the court's analysis to establish
whether or not Henderson's sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, 92 as
it had been for Justice Kennedy in Harmelin's case.' 93 Continuing with the
Solem analysis, the court also had to compare Henderson's sentence with
those of offenders in similar circumstances in Arkansas and in other juris-
dictions. 94 First, as to Arkansas, the court pointed to Justice Brown's dis-
sent in the Arkansas Supreme Court opinion below, which stated that Hen-
derson's case was the first in which the supreme court affirmed a life sen-
tence "where the defendant's crime was one offense and a first offense and
where the quantity of drugs sold was such a minor amount."' 95 The court
187. Henderson, 258 F.3d at 711.
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1998);
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983); Nelson v. Hall, 171 Ark. 683, 687, 285 S.W. 386,
388 (1926)).
190. Id. at 711-12 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 303) (fourth alteration in original).
191. Id. at 712.
192. Id.
193. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
194. Henderson, 258 F.3d at 712 (quoting Justice Kennedy's opinion in Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991)).
195. Id. (quoting Henderson v. State, 322 Ark. 402, 413, 910 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Brown,
J., dissenting)). The State's lawyers gave the district court the names of two people sentenced
to life in prison for a first offense involving a small amount of drugs, the court observed. Id.
The court, however, pointed out that one prisoner had his sentence overturned on other
grounds, and that the prison records of the second prisoner were so questionable in their
completeness and accuracy that they tended to confuse the issue. Id.
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also looked at Arkansas's own advisory sentencing guidelines and found
that, under those guidelines, Henderson would have received only a three-
and-one-half-year sentence. 96 That disparity between the guidelines's rec-
ommended sentence and the one actually imposed added to the court's con-
tention that Henderson's sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.'
97
The court then turned to comparing Henderson's case with similar ones
in other jurisdictions.'98 In its brief, the State cited two cases where defen-
dants had received long sentences for comparable offenses, but as the
Eighth Circuit pointed out, one was a forty-year-old case out of Washington
where the amount of drugs involved was not stated, decreasing the case's
persuasive value. 199 In the other case, two defendants were sentenced to
terms amounting to a term of years or life, and the court noted that the de-
fendants were eligible for parole after serving their minimum terms.200 In its
own research, the Eighth Circuit found three other states-Idaho, Montana,
and Oklahoma-that allowed life sentences for first offenses for delivering
small amounts of crack cocaine. 20 1 The court pointed out, though, that those
states merely authorized such punishments for those crimes, and that there
was no evidence that any defendant in those states has ever received that
maximum penalty. 20 2 Finally, looking at the federal sentencing guidelines,
the court said that Henderson's sentence in federal court would have been
only ten to sixteen months.20 3
Looking at the whole of its Solem analysis only strengthened the
court's initial determination that Henderson's sentence was grossly dispro-
portionate to his crime and violated the Eighth Amendment.204 As a result,
the court remanded the case to the district court to grant Henderson's writ of
habeas corpus if the state had not resentenced him within ninety days.
205
196. Id. at 713 (observing, however, that the statutory minimum of ten years in prison
would have overridden the advisory guidelines).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. (citing Washington v. Boggs, 358 P.2d 124, 125 (Wash. 1961)).
200. Henderson, 258 F.3d at 713 (citing Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 407 (2d Cir.
1978)).
201. Id.
202. Id. The court also noted that, with the possible exception of Idaho, those three states
appeared to allow for parole, even for a life sentence, without the need for commutation from
the governor. See id. at 713-14.
203. ld. at 714. The court added that even if a sentencing enhancement for Henderson's
alleged obstruction of justice had been imposed in a federal trial, such an enhancement
would have raised the sentence under the federal guidelines to fifteen to twenty-one months.
Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. The state attorney general decided not to petition the United States Supreme
Court for review, and the local prosecutor reached an agreement with Henderson on October




The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals's decision in Henderson is impor-
tant in two respects. First, it applies a common-sense meaning to the Eighth
Amendment, helping to keep it from becoming a quaint, but largely irrele-
vant, historical relic as the Third Amendment 20 6 has become. If the
Amendment only applies to types of punishment and not to the proportion-
ality of punishment to the crime, °7 and prison is an acceptable mode of
punishment (Justice Scalia's interpretation), then it is not inconceivable that
a legislature could mandate long prison sentences for the most minor of
offenses, say, a life term for unpaid traffic tickets. Under Justice Scalia's
reasoning, that sentence would have to be constitutionally acceptable be-
cause the mode of punishment, prison, is acceptable. 20 8 Of course, such a
penalty for such minor offenses would be absurd.209 The fact that our soci-
drug charge, while making Henderson eligible for parole. Telephone Interview with J. Tho-
mas Sullivan, Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen
School of Law and Counsel for Appellant (Nov. 4, 2001); see also supra notes 184-86 and
accompanying text (discussing the difference between sentences of life and life without the
possibility of parole).
206. U.S. CONST. amend. III. "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed
by law." Id. Of the few times the Third Amendment has been cited, most have involved the
Amendment as one of the "penumbra" of constitutional provisions incorporating a right to
privacy and not the literal quartering of soldiers. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 350 (1967); Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 961-62 (2d Cir. 1982); Commonwealth v.
Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898, 903-04 (Mass. 1969); State v. Coburn, 530 P.2d 442, 446 (Mont.
1974).
207. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991) (plurality opinion).
208. Justice Scalia did say, "This is not to say that there are no absolutes," and that "one
can imagine extreme examples that no rational person, in no time and place, could accept.
But for the same reason these examples are easy to decide, they are certain never to occur."
Id. at 985-86. This sounds very much like a "grossly disproportionate" standard employed by
Justice Kennedy, albeit a bar set much higher. Also, Justice Scalia does not attempt to set out
such an example, leaving the question open as to what he might consider so extreme. It is
also conceivable that a reasonable person might have considered a life sentence for a first-
time offender on a small drug sale as one "certain never to occur," thus leaving the door
open, even under Justice Scalia's rationale, for the Eighth Circuit to do exactly what it did.
209. Even Justice Scalia might agree. But seeing that prison is an acceptable mode of
punishment, how could one justify holding such a punishment unconstitutional if it were one
validly approved by the legislative branch and did not "shock the moral sense of the commu-
nity," see Henderson v. State, 322 Ark. 402, 411-12, 910 S.W.2d 656, 660 (1995), unless one
looked to the absolute magnitude of the harm done? This was one of the standards employed
in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), that Justice Scalia would have overruled in Har-
melin, 501 U.S. at 965.
In April 2002 the Court granted certiorari, see Lockyer v. Andrade, 122 S. Ct. 1434
(2002) (mem.), to a case that will allow the Court to revisit the issue of disproportionate
prison sentences and the Eighth Amendment. David G. Savage, Supreme Court to Hear
Three-Strikes Challenge, L.A. TIMES, April 2, 2002 at Al. At issue will be whether Califor-
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ety does not mete out such physically barbarous punishments as disembow-
eling or burning at the stake-in other words, because we have become
more mature and humane in how we treat our convicted criminals-should
be no reason why we should lose a key constitutional protection against a
potentially unreasonably hard-line legislature. Yes, we have a republican
form of government whereby we elect representatives to make governmen-
tal decisions for us, but that state of affairs must be restrained by our Consti-
tution, which from time to time has to step in to tell our elected representa-
tives that "you can't do that." This is not a matter of the Constitution being
a "living" document, which can be invoked and misused by some to in-
crease governmental power over the citizenry. Instead, it is one of maintain-
ing the Constitution as a government-limiting document. Interpreting the
Eighth Amendment as containing a proportionality guarantee does not be-
tray, but rather reinforces, that principle.
The second area in which the Eighth Circuit's opinion is significant is
akin to the first. The opinion represents a dollop of common-sense medicine
into a society that has sickened itself with its "War on Drugs." The federal
government spends roughly $17 billion per year to wage the "War on
Drugs," 210 and America as a whole spends roughly $110 million in taxpayer
money per day incarcerating and arresting in connection with drugs, treating
nia's "three strikes" law, in which an offender is subject to a long prison term upon convic-
tion of a third felony offense, is constitutional as applied to offenders whose third strike is a
minor, non-violent crime. Id.
The Court may well use the case of Leandro Andrade to take a fresh look at its
decision in Harmelin, which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used in
holding Andrade's sentence unconstitutional. See Andrade v. Attorney Gen. of California,
270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001). A California jury convicted Andrade of two petty thefts of
video tapes, worth a total value of $153. Id. Because of prior non-violent convictions, prose-
cutors used the three strikes law to enhance the usual misdemeanor petty theft charges into
felonies. Id. at 746. As a result, Andrade was sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility for parole for fifty years. Id.
The Ninth Circuit overturned Andrade's sentence as being unconstitutional because
it was "grossly disproportionate" to his crimes. Id. at 747. In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit
court first reviewed the United States Supreme Court decisions in Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263 (1980), see notes 96-104 and accompanying text, and Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277
(1983), see notes 106-15 and accompanying text. Then the court turned to the Harmelin
decision. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 756-57. The court of appeals stated that while there was no
majority opinion in Harmelin, there were seven justices who favored some form of propor-
tionality review. Id. at 757. At the end of its discussion of the cases, the court concluded that
Harmelin did nothing to change the law established in Solem. Id. at 758. The court then
proceeded to analyze Andrade's sentence through the prism set forth by Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Harmelin, id. at 758-66, following which it concluded that Andrade's sen-
tence was so grossly disproportionate to his crime that it violated the Eighth Amendment. Id.
at 766. The court, however, limited its decision to Andrade's case alone and did not invali-
date California's three strike law as facially unconstitutional. Id. at 767.
210. Jim Oliphant, Heeding the Lessons of the War on Drugs, RECORDER, Oct. 12, 2001,
at 3, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
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drug users, or trying to keep people from using drugs.2 ' Upwards of
460,000 of the roughly two million people in American prisons are there for
drug offenses,212 a nine-fold increase since 1980.213
When we set aside all of the chest-thumping rhetoric, which tends to
come more out of the realm of emotion rather than reason, we have to ask
ourselves whether it truly makes sense to subject someone for selling less
than one gram of cocaine, particularly a first-time offender, to the same
range of prison time that we reserve for first-degree murderers, kidnappers,
or rapists.21 4 The Eighth Circuit clearly thought it does not.
It should be noted that any widespread application of the Eighth Cir-
cuit's ruling in the case is not likely, given the specific facts in Henderson's
case: a first-time offender selling such a small of amount of drugs being
given such a hefty punishment. Indeed, Arkansas Supreme Court Justice
Robert Brown, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Henderson's Arkansas
appeal, acknowledged that such cases calling for the application of a
proportionality principle would be rare.21 5 But the Eighth Circuit's opinion
should serve to tell legislators that they cannot affix just any prison time
they deem appropriate, irrespective of the offense.
The application of the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996 may also mute the effect of the decision. That statute will
make state prisoner appeals to the federal courts much more difficult by
placing limits on habeas corpus petitions.1 6




stands as a beacon that the Eighth Amendment is still alive as a hedge
against governmental power. It also confirms that reason can still be found
afloat in a swirling sea of irrationality when it comes to fighting drug abuse
in this country.
Ray S. Pierce*
211. Carl M. Cannon, Tempering the War, NAT'L J., Aug. 18, 2001, at 2, available at
2002 WL 7094642.
212. Id.
213. See Jane Blotzer, Editorial, The Drug War is Insane, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETrE,
May 20, 2001, at E-1, available at 2001 WL 3390548 (stating that in 1980 the number of
people incarcerated for drug offenses was about 50,000).
214. Under Arkansas law, all of the above offenses are Class Y felonies. See ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 5-10-102(b)-(c), -103(b) (Michie Repi. 1997). The prison term set out for Class Y
felonies is ten to forty years, or life. Id. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (Michie Repl. 1997). The selling of
fewer than twenty-eight grams of a Schedule I or II controlled substance is also considered a
Class Y felony. Id. § 5-64-401(a)(1) (LEXIS Supp. 2001); see also supra text accompanying
notes 182-86.
215. Henderson v. State, 322 Ark. 402, 415, 910 S.W.2d 656, 662 (1995) (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
216. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
217. 258 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2001).
* B.S., Univ. of Texas, 1987; M.A., Univ. of Ark. at Little Rock, 1995; J.D. expected,
2002]
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Univ. of Ark. at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law, May 2003. The author would
like to express his profound and sincere appreciation to Laurie Pierce for her Job-like pa-
tience and endurance while the author was away from home writing this note. The author
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